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Literature on attitude similarity suggests that sharing similar attitudes enhances
interpersonal liking, but it remains unanswered whether this effect also holds for
ambivalent attitudes. In the present research, we shed light on the role attitudinal
ambivalence plays in interpersonal liking. Specifically, we examine whether people
express ambivalence strategically to generate a positive or negative social image, and
whether this is dependent on the attitudinal ambivalence of their perceiver. We test
two alternative hypotheses. In line with the attitude-similarity effect, people should
express ambivalence toward ambivalent others to enhance interpersonal liking, as
sharing ambivalence might socially validate the latter’s experience of attitudinal conflict.
On the other hand, people might express more univalence, as ambivalence may drive
ambivalent others toward the resolution of their attitudinal conflict, and univalent stances
could help to achieve that goal. In two studies (N = 449, 149), people expressed similar
attitudes to those of their perceivers, even when the latter experienced attitudinal conflict
(Studies 1 and 2). Moreover, they composed an essay, the message of which validated
their perceiver’s attitudinal conflict (Study 2). In line with these results, we further observe
that the more people experienced their ambivalence as conflicting, the more they liked
others who similarly experienced attitudinal conflict (Study 1). These findings suggest
that the expression of ambivalence can have important interpersonal functions, as
it might lead to an enhanced social image when interacting with those coping with
attitudinal conflict.
Keywords: ambivalence, interpersonal liking, attitude similarity, social validation, attitudinal conflict, self-
presentation
INTRODUCTION
Imagine two individuals, Sam and Robin, who meet for the first time and engage in a conversation
about nuclear disarmament. During the conversation, Sam learns that Robin holds a favorable
view toward nuclear disarmament. If Sam aimed to make a good impression on Robin, his best
bet would probably be to express a similarly positive opinion about the topic. In contrast, Sam
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could presumably share an opposing negative view if his goal
was to be negatively perceived by Robin. These rather intuitive
predictions are supported by extensive research on the so-called
“attitude-similarity” effect (e.g., Singh et al., 2008; Reid et al.,
2013; Sprecher, 2014).
Most of the work on attitude similarity focuses on situations
where individuals hold one-sided or univalent attitudes (e.g.,
if Sam and Robin support or oppose nuclear disarmament).
However, reality is often more complex, and most people
hold two-sided or ambivalent attitudes toward a wide variety
of attitude objects, e.g., immigration (Reyna et al., 2013),
gender roles (Sjöberg, 2010), gay rights (Garner, 2013),
geopolitics (Stoeckel, 2013), green products (Chang, 2011),
or meat consumption (Onwezen and van der Weele, 2016).
Despite the ubiquitous nature of ambivalent attitudes, the role
that ambivalent attitudes play in interpersonal liking remains
widely unexplored.
The present work aims to shed light on what Sam would
do in order to make a favorable impression on Robin, if the
latter held an ambivalent attitude about nuclear disarmament.
Put differently, we investigate whether people are able to infer
the similarity–dissimilarity preferences of ambivalent others and
adjust their attitude expression to enhance or depreciate their
own interpersonal liking. Thus, we intend to contribute both
to the literature on ambivalence as well as to the literature
on attitude similarity by examining the strategic expression of
ambivalent attitudes in the context of interpersonal liking and
self-presentation.
Research on attitude similarity consistently shows that sharing
similar attitudes toward different topics (e.g., disliking modern
art, opposing socialism, and enjoying science fiction) predicts
interpersonal liking (Byrne, 1961; Byrne and Nelson, 1965b;
Byrne et al., 1968a), even over and above other factors related
to interpersonal attraction, such as physical attractiveness (Byrne
et al., 1968b). With regard to its generalizability, the attitude-
similarity effect has been further observed in children (Fawcett
and Markson, 2010) and adolescents (Cavior and Dokecki, 1973)
and also across different cultures (Byrne et al., 1971). Its most
influential explanatory framework is the reinforcement theory of
attraction (Byrne, 1961; Byrne and Nelson, 1965a). This theory
postulates that those who share similar attitudes are likely to be
perceived as more attractive, because they induce positive affect
through the reinforcement or validation of one’s own beliefs,
opinions, or feelings. Recent research supports this notion by
showing that the relationship between attitude similarity and
interpersonal liking is indeed sequentially mediated by feelings
of validation and positive affect (Singh et al., 2017).
The attitude-similarity effect has implications for self-
presentation contexts (e.g., a first date, a job interview, or a
political debate), where people aim to make a good impression
on others. In these situations, people may strive to convey
attitude similarity in order to enhance their social image, leading
them strategically to express attitudes similar to those of their
perceivers. Previous work has emphasized the social value of
attitude similarity in self-presentation settings. In one study,
people presented themselves to a third party based on their
evaluation of a partner who held similar (vs. dissimilar) attitudes.
When asked to make a good impression on the third party, people
valued the partner who shared similar (vs. dissimilar) attitudes
more positively (Jellison and Oliver, 1983). This finding suggests
that people are conscious about the social value that attitude
similarity has for others, and that this affects their strategy when
aiming to project a positive social image.
Attitude-similarity literature has mainly focused on univalent
attitudes while overlooking ambivalent attitudes. This is
not surprising given that researchers became interested in
ambivalence only relatively recently (Thompson et al., 1995;
Jonas et al., 1997). In psychology, ambivalence generally refers
to simultaneous positive and negative evaluations of the same
attitude object (Jonas et al., 2000). Research on ambivalence
distinguishes two conceptualizations of this construct (cf. van
Harreveld et al., 2015), and their different motivational and
behavioral implications give rise to different predictions with
respect to interpersonal liking.
The first, Objective Ambivalence (OA), refers to the structure
of the attitude, characterized by the concurrence of positive
and negative evaluative components (Kaplan, 1972; Eagly
and Chaiken, 1998). Measures of OA take into account
both the similarity and strength of the positive and the
negative evaluations (Thompson et al., 1995). In line with the
attitude-similarity effect, a first possibility is that ambivalent
individuals show stronger preferences toward others with a
similarly ambivalent attitude structure. The few studies that have
investigated ambivalence in the context of interpersonal liking
have provided indirect evidence for this notion. For example,
a study showed that when presenting two fictitious characters
as having a similar ambivalent attitude toward each other (i.e.,
[Robin] likes and dislikes [Sam] and vice versa), people perceived
their relationship as more stable than when their attitudes
differed (Miller and Geller, 1972). In a different study, people
were asked to report their preference between two targets who
expressed either ambivalence (i.e., expressing oneself in part
very positively and in part very negatively) or indifference (i.e.,
expressing oneself neutrally) about several ambivalent attitude
objects (e.g., euthanasia). Researchers found that ambivalent
participants tended to prefer the ambivalent target relative to the
indifferent target (Ullrich and Krueger, 2010). Altogether, these
findings suggest that similar levels of OA (i.e., shared attitudinal
structure) might cue interpersonal liking.
The second conceptualization, Subjective Ambivalence
(SA), refers to the meta-emotional response to the perceived
inconsistency in the structure of an ambivalent attitude
(Priester and Petty, 1996). SA relates to the negative affect often
experienced when one recognizes ambivalence as an attitudinal
conflict (Newby-Clark et al., 2002; Nordgren et al., 2006). In
these cases, people feel motivated to reduce the psychological
discomfort (van Harreveld et al., 2009) or to resolve their
attitudinal conflict (Clark et al., 2008; Sawicki et al., 2013;
DeMarree et al., 2015). These motivational effects of ambivalence
have implications in the context of interpersonal liking, as
they might determine the interpersonal preferences of those
coping with the unpleasantness of ambivalence. In particular,
subjectively ambivalent individuals might arguably like others
who facilitate the accomplishment of one of these motivated
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goals, leading to two possible alternatives. On the one hand,
subjectively ambivalent individuals might prefer ambivalent
others who feel similarly conflicted about the same topic, as the
latter could socially validate the affective experience of attitudinal
conflict. On the other hand, subjectively ambivalent individuals
might like others who facilitate the resolution of their attitudinal
conflict, even when these do not necessarily hold a similarly
ambivalent attitude. In this respect, univalent others could
plausibly become an attractive option as providers of one-sided
information, which might help to resolve the ambivalence, and
with it, reduce its psychological discomfort.
The proposed alternative (and opposing) predictions about
the social preferences of ambivalent individuals also relate to
how individuals present themselves when interacting with an
ambivalent other. As discussed earlier, the strategic expression
of attitudes, including ambivalent attitudes, can be a crucial
resource in the enhancement (or depreciation) of one’s social
image in a self-presentation context. In the case of ambivalence,
previous work shows that people regulate the expression of
ambivalent attitudes based on the impression they aim to create
on others. Specifically, people reported more ambivalence when
they aimed to generate a positive impression, which they seemed
to do by default in a baseline condition, in comparison with
when they intended to generate a negative impression (Pillaud
et al., 2013). The authors argue that the expression of ambivalence
can function as a cue of social competence when discussing
controversial topics, i.e., when others may appreciate pondered
and balanced information about both sides of a controversy
(Pillaud et al., 2013, 2018).
We follow up on these results and argue that the expression
of ambivalence—and, by extension, of other kinds of attitudes—
likely depends on the ambivalence expressed by the perceiver.
According to the attitude-similarity literature, the extent to
which the expression of attitudes can be an efficient resource
for the enhancement (vs. depreciation) of interpersonal liking
substantially hinges on the degree of similarity with the
perceiver. However, in the case of an ambivalent perceiver and,
more concretely, of those who experience ambivalence as an
attitudinal conflict, it is not clear whether the expression of
similar ambivalence would lead to higher interpersonal liking in
contrast to the expression of univalent attitudes. As previously
argued, both alternatives could fulfill—or truncate—distinct
psychological needs of the perceiver (i.e., validate vs. resolve the
attitudinal conflict). If perceivers aim to reduce their experienced
discomfort, they should prefer someone who validates their
attitudinal conflict, rather than someone who offers one-sided
information to resolve it. Alternatively, if perceivers aimed to
resolve the attitudinal conflict, they should prefer someone who
offered one-sided information to someone who validated the
conflict. The present work seeks to provide answers to this matter.
RESEARCH OVERVIEW
In two studies, we investigated the expression of ambivalence as a
function of the perceiver’s attitudinal profile in a self-presentation
setting. We tested two main alternative hypotheses:
H1. People express more ambivalence when aiming to be
judged positively (vs. negatively) by an ambivalent perceiver.
H1′. People express more univalent attitudes when aiming to
be judged positively (vs. negatively) by an ambivalent perceiver.
H1 was based on the assumption that the expression of
ambivalence would be used as a social validation of the perceiver’s
ambivalence, whereas H1′ entailed the intention of resolving
the perceiver’s attitudinal conflict through the provision of one-
sided information.
Moreover, for perceivers holding univalent attitudes, we
expected to replicate patterns of attitude similarity.
Beyond the strategic expression of ambivalence, Study
1 further explored whether ambivalent individuals liked
ambivalent (vs. univalent) others. This would clarify whether
people’s self-presentation strategy aligned to the similarity–
dissimilarity preferences of ambivalent individuals. For its part,
Study 2, which was pre-registered, additionally introduced the
possibility of analyzing whether the strategic expression of
ambivalence was driven by the underlying intention of socially
validating the attitudinal conflict of others.
STUDY 1
In Study 1, we examined whether people strategically based their
attitude expression on their perceiver’s attitude profile, with the
goal of enhancing their interpersonal liking. For this purpose,
we adapted the “self-presentation paradigm” used by Pillaud
et al. (2013). In this paradigm, people express their attitudes
about a specific attitude object with the objective of making
a positive (i.e., self-enhancement condition) or negative (i.e.,
self-depreciation condition) impression on a perceiver. These
expressed attitudes are compared with a baseline measure of
participants’ attitudes (i.e., control condition). In our case, we
used the topic of “unrestricted freedom of speech” as attitude
object. We chose freedom of speech because it has been argued
as eliciting ambivalence (Downs and Cowan, 2012), and because
it was of contemporary relevance on the dates of data collection
(i.e., June 2017) due to the rise of populist political speeches in
Western politics.
In contrast to the original paradigm, where people lacked
information about their perceiver, we manipulated the perceiver’s
attitudinal profile. We configured three attitudinal profiles by
independently manipulating two attitudinal elements: first, the
level of OA for comparing between univalent (i.e., low OA)
and ambivalent perceivers (i.e., high OA) and second, the level
of SA for comparing between ambivalent perceivers with low
and high experienced attitudinal conflict. Thus, one of the three
different perceivers represented a univalent attitude holder (i.e.,
low OA) with a univalent positive attitude.1 This univalent
perceiver would allow to reproduce the attitude-similarity effect
by observing the expression of similar (vs. dissimilar) attitude
valence in the self-enhancement (vs. self-depreciation) condition.
The other two perceivers represented ambivalent attitude holders
1We decided to include only one univalent positive (vs. negative) profile to simplify
our experimental design, and consequently to increase the statistical power of our
analyses. Study 2 included a univalent negative perceiver.
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(i.e., high OA) who differed in their level of experienced conflict:
low SA or objectively ambivalent and high SA or subjectively
ambivalent. In this case, the distinction between objectively and
subjectively ambivalent perceiver allowed to examine whether the
aforementioned motivational effects of subjective ambivalence
(i.e., inclination toward the reduction of its psychological
discomfort vs. the resolution of the attitudinal conflict) implied
a qualitative difference that people considered in their self-
presentation strategy.
Thus, the study followed a 3 × 3 mixed factorial design,
with the self-presentation instructions as within-subject factor
(control, self-enhancement, and self-depreciation) and the
perceiver’s attitudinal profile as between-subject factor (univalent
positive, objectively ambivalent, and subjectively ambivalent).
The dependent variables were levels of OA and SA and the
attitude valence expressed by participants. Compared with their
baseline attitudes, we expected that people would express more
OA and less SA toward the objectively ambivalent perceiver in
the self-enhancement condition, whereas in the self-depreciation
condition, they would express less OA and SA. With regard to
the subjectively ambivalent perceiver, we predicted that people
would express more OA and SA in the self-enhancement
condition, whereas in the self-depreciation condition, the
expressed OA and SA will be lower. Lastly, those presenting
themselves to the univalent positive perceiver would express
more positive (i.e., similar) attitudes in the self-enhancement
condition and more negative (i.e., dissimilar) attitudes in the
self-depreciation condition.
As a secondary goal, Study 1 aimed to explore whether
people’s ambivalence predicted the interpersonal liking of the
ambivalent (vs. univalent) perceivers. Therefore, in addition to




This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations and protocol approval of the Ethics Review
Board of the Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences (FMG) of
the University of Amsterdam. All subjects gave written informed
consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Participants
According to an a priori power analysis using G∗Power 3.1.9.2,
we estimated a minimum sample size of 264. Significance
level, correlation among repeated measures, and non-sphericity
correction were kept constant at α = 0.05, r = 0.50, and ε = 0.75,
respectively. For the expected two-way interaction between the
between- and the within-subject factor with a medium effect size
(i.e., η2p = 0.09), the estimated sample size for a statistical power
of 0.96 was 66 participants. However, to detect a medium effect
size in the follow-up between-subject comparisons, we estimated
a minimum of 88 participants per group for a 95% statistical
power. We recruited an online sample of 581 participants from
the online market Crowdflower (currently, Figure Eight), who
were paid 0.50 USD (n = 544), and from the University of
Amsterdam, in this case compensated with 0.25 course credits
(n = 37). We excluded data from 121 participants who did not
answer or missed an attention check for screening out random
clicking (i.e., “In this question, we want you to click on number
six”), eight who did not complete all the dependent measures,
two participants who reported to be underage (i.e., below 18),
and one participant from the University of Amsterdam who had
participated in a related study. The final sample consisted of 449
participants (57.2% females, Mage = 35.76, SDage = 13.37, ranging
from 18 to 76), 84% were from the United States, 7% from the
Netherlands, and the remaining 8% from other countries.
Procedure
Participants provided informed consent through a Qualtrics
survey (Qualtrics, 2018; Provo, UT, United States), which
described the study and its focus on personal opinions and
feelings about unrestricted freedom of speech. After reporting
demographics and creating an anonymous ID code, participants
completed a questionnaire including the baseline measures
of OA and SA toward unrestricted freedom of speech (i.e.,
control condition).
Next, participants learned that the responses of a randomly
selected participant from a previous experiment would be
presented to them. The survey simulated a data-transfer process
and displayed a random ID, ostensibly identifying a real
participant. The responses of this participant appeared on screen,
reflecting one of the three manipulated attitudinal profiles
(i.e., univalent positive, objectively ambivalent, subjectively
ambivalent; see Supplementary Material). Then, participants
responded to several manipulation checks assessing whether
participants perceived the manipulated attitudinal profiles as
intended (e.g., “To what extent do you think the opinion that
participant 67A12 has about [attitude object] is positive or
negative/participant 67A12 has a clear or confusing opinion about
[attitude object]/participant 67A12 feels confident or unconfident
about his/her opinion about [attitude object]?”).
After responding to the manipulation checks, the self-
presentation manipulation followed. Participants had to respond
to the same questionnaire about unrestricted freedom of speech
(i.e., measures of OA and SA) with the objective of making a
specific impression on participant 67A12. The self-presentation
instructions were the same as used by Pillaud et al. (2013). In the
self-enhancement condition, the instructions read: “As you fill in
the questionnaire, we would like you to try to generate a GOOD
image of yourself. That is, to answer in such a way as to be judged
in a POSITIVE way by participant 67A12.” In the self-depreciation
condition, the words GOOD and POSITIVE were exchanged for
BAD and NEGATIVE, respectively. The order of presentation of
both within-subject conditions was counterbalanced.
The last part of this survey consisted of the evaluation of
the perceiver’s interpersonal liking. Further exploratory measures
of interest in discussing the topic of unrestricted freedom of
speech with the perceiver, the perceiver’s relative knowledge
and instrumentality, and emotional closeness to the perceiver
were part of this last questionnaire and can be accessed in the
Supplementary Material. After responding to these questions,
participants were debriefed and provided with information for
receiving their compensation.
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Measures
Objective ambivalence
We evaluated participants’ OA through a bivariate scale
consisting of two 4-point items that asked, respectively, to
consider the positive or negative aspects of unrestricted freedom
of speech and report how positive or negative the participant
evaluated it (1—not at all positive or negative, 4—extremely
positive or negative). We used the following formula, OA = 1/2
(Positive + Negative) – |Positive – Negative| (Thompson
et al., 1995), to calculate an OA index, with higher scores
indicating higher OA.
Subjective ambivalence
We assessed participants’ SA through the Subjective Ambivalence
Scale (Priester and Petty, 1996), which consists of three 11-point
scales that measured the experienced conflict, indecision, and
mixed reactions toward unrestricted freedom of speech (0—I
feel no conflict at all, I feel no indecision at all, Completely one-
sided reactions, 10—I feel maximum conflict, I feel maximum
indecision, Completely mixed-sided reactions). We computed
an SA index by averaging the score of these three items
(α = 0.827).
Attitudinal valence
We used the bivariate scale from the OA measure to estimate
participants’ attitudinal valence and computed the difference
between how positive and how negative participants evaluated
unrestricted freedom of speech, with higher scores reflecting
more positive (vs. negative) attitudes.
Interpersonal liking
The perceiver’s interpersonal liking was measured with a single
item, “How much would you like this person?”. The item used a
7-point scale (1—I would not like this person at all, 7—I would
really like this person).
Results
Manipulation Checks
Three independent GLM analyses showed that participants
distinguished the different perceivers in line with the
manipulated attitudinal profiles. Specifically, we observed
significant between-subject differences in the extent
to which people evaluated their perceiver’s opinion as
positive/negative, F(2,446) = 17.933, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.074,
clear/confused, F(2,446) = 57.500, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.205,
and confident/unconfident, F(2,446) = 53.779, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.194. With the exception of the difference in
positivity/negativity between the univalent positive and the
objectively ambivalent perceivers (p = 0.41), every pairwise
comparison reached significance (ps ≤ 0.045) after applying
Bonferroni corrections. As Table 1 summarizes, the univalent
positive and the objectively ambivalent perceivers were
perceived significantly more positive in their attitude than
the subjectively ambivalent, whereas the latter was perceived
as the perceiver with the most confused and the least confident
stance, followed by the objectively ambivalent, and ending with
the univalent positive.
Ambivalence and Self-Presentation
Our main goal was to disentangle whether the expression of
OA, SA, and attitude valence differed across self-presentation
conditions as a function of the perceiver’s attitudinal profile.
Thus, our main interest was the interaction between self-
presentation and attitudinal profile. We tested three independent
mixed models that included the fixed effects of the self-
presentation instructions and the perceiver’s attitudinal profile,
together with their two-way interaction. The models additionally
accounted for the within-subject nature of our data by including
the participants’ ID as random factor. When any mixed model
showed a singular fit, which generally suggests that the model’s
random structure overfits the data (Bates et al., 2018), we
instead conducted a repeated measures GLM analysis without the
random factor. In what follows, we will describe the results for
each of the different dependent measures.
Objective ambivalence
The fixed effects of both the self-presentation instructions,
F(2,892) = 129.090, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.185, and the perceiver’s
attitudinal profile, F(2,446) = 62.286, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.086,
were significant. Furthermore, the two-way interaction between
these two factors was significant, F(4,892) = 36.417, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.114 (see Figure 1A). We further examined this interaction
with simple effect analyses—from here on, every simple
effect analysis reported in the manuscript included Bonferroni
adjustments for multiple comparisons. In the self-enhancement
condition, people who were matched with the objectively and
the subjectively ambivalent perceivers expressed significantly
higher OA than the baseline (ps < 0.001), with slightly higher
expressed OA toward the subjectively ambivalent (p = 0.015). In
contrast, those participants who were matched with the univalent
positive perceiver reported a lower level of OA relative to the
baseline (p < 0.001). In the self-depreciation condition, people
significantly reduced their expressed OA toward the objectively
ambivalent (p < 0.001) and the univalent positive (p < 0.001)
perceivers in comparison with the baseline, but this was not the
case for those matched with the subjectively ambivalent perceiver
(p = 0.14).
The observed interaction showed a general tendency to
express ambivalent (univalent) attitudes similar to the ones
expressed by the ambivalent (univalent) perceivers when the aim
was to make a good impression, but people generally expressed
more dissimilarly univalent attitudes when instructed to make
a bad impression. This expression of univalent attitudes in the
self-depreciation condition was, in the case of the ambivalent
TABLE 1 | Estimated mean levels of manipulations checks used to describe the




Univalent positive 5.25 [5.01, 5.48] 5.17 [4.91, 5.44] 5.62 [5.37, 5.88]
Objectively ambivalent 5.00 [4.77, 5.23] 4.71 [4.45, 4.97] 5.01 [4.75, 5.26]
Subjectively ambivalent 4.27 [4.03, 4.51] 3.19 [2.92, 3.46] 3.72 [3.46, 3.98]
In brackets, lower and upper bounds of 95% CIs. Scales were from 1 to 7.
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FIGURE 1 | Moderated influence of self-presentation instructions by the perceiver’s attitudinal profile on reported OA (A), SA (B), and attitude valence (C) in Study 1.
Error bars represent 95% CIs.
perceivers, a clear dissimilarity from their two-sided attitudes;
for the univalent positive perceiver, however, the dissimilarity
potentially corresponded to the expression of univalent attitudes
of opposite (negative) valence. Our measure of attitude valence
would clarify this issue.
Subjective ambivalence
The main effect of self-presentation on reported SA was
significant, F(1.534,683.967) = 24.162, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.051,
but the effect of the perceiver’s attitudinal profile was not,
F(2,446) = 0.898, p = 0.408, η2p = 0.004. A significant two-way
interaction between self-presentation instructions and attitudinal
profile, F(3.067,683.967) = 54.835, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.197,
indicated different levels of expressed SA toward the different
perceivers across self-presentation conditions (see Figure 1B).
Simple effects analysis showed that, in the self-enhancement
condition, those participants who were matched with the
subjectively ambivalent perceiver reported a significantly higher
level of SA relative to the baseline (p < 0.001), whereas those
matched with the objectively ambivalent and the univalent
positive perceivers reported a lower level of SA (ps < 0.001).
This indicates that when people aimed to enhance their social
image, they expressed SA only when it resembled the experienced
attitudinal conflict of their perceiver. A reversed pattern emerged
in the self-depreciation condition, in which those who were
asked to generate a negative image on the subjectively ambivalent
perceiver deviated from his/her experience of conflict by
reporting a significantly lower level of SA than the baseline
(p = 0.007). In the case of those participants who were
matched with the univalent positive perceiver and the objectively
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ambivalent perceiver, they expressed significantly higher SA
relative to their baseline (ps ≤ 0.018). Therefore, the expression
of SA also aimed to project a negative social image on those who
expressed a clear univalent stance or who held a (structurally)
ambivalent attitude but did not experience it as conflicting. From
this subset of findings, it is important to highlight the distinct
self-presentation strategies that people used with the objectively
and the subjectively ambivalent perceivers. They presumably
indicated that people inferred different similarity–dissimilarity
social preferences from these two ambivalent perceivers, based
on the manipulated difference between them, this was the level
of expressed attitudinal conflict (i.e., low vs. high SA).
Attitude valence
The self-presentation manipulation significantly affected the
expressed attitude valence, F(1.587,707.932) = 314.778, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.414, as opposed to the perceivers’ attitudinal profile,
F(2,446) = 0.990, p = 0.372, η2p = 0.004. However, the effect
of self-presentation was moderated by the perceiver’s attitudinal
profile (see Figure 1C), as indicated by the significant two-
way interaction between both factors, F(3.175,707.932) = 28.936,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.115. Simple effect analyses indicated that in
the self-enhancement condition, participants matched with the
univalent positive perceiver expressed more positive attitudes
relative to their baseline (p < 0.001). Those matched with the
subjectively ambivalent perceiver expressed less positive attitudes
relative to the baseline (p < 0.001), whereas the attitude valence
of those matched with the objectively ambivalent perceiver did
not differ (p = 0.99). In the self-depreciation condition, people
reported more negative attitudes toward the three different
profiles than the baselines (ps < 0.001). However, those matched
with the univalent positive perceiver expressed the most negative
attitudes relative to the ambivalent profiles (ps < 0.001), with no
significant differences between these two (p = 0.221). As argued
above, we observed that a similarity–dissimilarity effect occurred
with the univalent perceiver. However, this corresponded to
the expression of similar (vs. dissimilar) univalent (positive or
negative) attitudes when the objective was to make a good (vs.
bad) impression.
Ambivalence and Liking
In addition to participants’ self-presentation, we examined
whether participants’ (ambivalent) attitudes influenced the
evaluation of the interpersonal liking of the manipulated
perceivers. Thus, the tested model included the measures of
participant’s OA, SA, and attitude valence and the perceiver’s
attitudinal profile as between-subject factor. As we expected the
effect of participants’ ambivalence on interpersonal liking to
differ across the perceiver’s attitudinal profile, our main focus was
the two-way interactions of the participants’ attitude measures
(i.e., OA, SA, and valence) with the perceiver’s attitudinal profile.
Furthermore, we tested whether the predictive value of attitude
valence differed based on the level of experienced ambivalence.
Therefore, we further entered the two-way interaction between
SA and attitude valence and the three-way interaction with
the perceiver’s attitudinal profile. The measures of participants’
attitudes were z-standardized in order to avoid multicollinearity
issues with the interaction terms.
The GLM analysis showed significant main effects of
participant’s OA, F(1,434) = 17.397, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.039,
and the perceiver’s attitudinal profile, F(2,434) = 3.106,
p = 0.046, η2p = 0.014. There was also a significant interaction
between the perceiver’s attitudinal profile and participant’s SA,
F(2,434) = 14.676, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.063. Specifically, participants’
SA only predicted the liking ratings of the subjectively ambivalent
perceiver, β = 0.29, t(434) = 3.351, p < 0.001, 95% CIs [0.12, 0.46],
showing an ambivalence-similarity pattern. Although liking
toward the univalent positive, β = −0.16, t(434) = −1.802,
p = 0.072, 95% CIs [−0.33, 0.01], and the objectively ambivalent
perceivers, β = −0.08, t(434) = −0.936, p = 0.350, 95% CIs
[−0.25, 0.09], was not significantly affected by participants’
SA, the negative directionality of the observed trends indicated
that participants considered to some degree the dissimilarity
of these two perceivers in the level of experienced attitudinal
conflict when assessing their interpersonal liking. Moreover, we
observed a significant interaction between attitude valence and
the perceiver’s attitudinal profile, F(2,434) = 5.957, p = 0.003,
η2p = 0.027, which showed that the valence of participants’
attitudes positively predicted the interpersonal liking of the
univalent positive perceiver in line with the classical attitude-
similarity effect, β = 0.48, t(434) = 3.501, p < 0.001, 95% CIs
[0.21, 0.74]. This was not the case for the objectively ambivalent,
β =−0.15, t(434) =−1.743, p = 0.082, 95% CIs [−0.02, 0.33], nor
the subjectively ambivalent perceivers, β = 0.11, t(434) = 0.923,
p = 0.356, 95% CIs [−0.12, 0.34]. Any other main or interaction
effect was not significant.
Discussion
Study 1 offers evidence for the strategic expression of
ambivalence in a self-presentation setting, where the perceiver’s
attitudinal profile determined the extent to which people express
ambivalence. When people aimed to generate a positive image
on another person, they mirrored the attitudinal profile of their
perceiver in a structural (i.e., overall valence and level of OA)
and an affective level (i.e., level of SA), even when their perceiver
was ambivalent. In contrast, when people intended to generate
a negative image, they reversed their perceiver’s profile by either
reporting an attitude contrary in valence—in the case of the
univalent perceiver—or opposing levels of OA and SA—in the
case of the objectively and subjectively perceivers. We also found
evidence of similarity patterns when observing that participants’
SA positively predicted interpersonal liking toward a subjectively
ambivalent other, whereas a congruent attitude valence predicted
it toward a univalent other.
From these findings, we believe that participants made use
of ambivalence in an attempt to create attitude similarity, but,
more importantly, emotional similarity between them and their
perceiver. This is particularly salient in the distinction between
the subjectively and the objectively ambivalent perceivers,
where emotional similarity could function as the social
validation of the former’s experience of attitudinal conflict.
Our results supported this rationale in two respects. First,
people expressed more ambivalent attitudes and presented
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themselves as similarly conflicted when aiming to positively
impress a person who experienced an attitudinal conflict; second,
ambivalent individuals liked the perceiver who expressed a
similar experience of attitudinal conflict. This suggests that
ambivalent attitude holders could be positively perceived as
sources of emotional understanding and support when sharing
the unpleasant experience of conflict.
STUDY 2
Study 2 examined whether people’s intention when expressing
ambivalence is indeed the social validation of the attitudinal
conflict experienced by ambivalent others. While it has been
suggested that ambivalence functions as a cue of social
competence when addressing a controversial topic (Pillaud et al.,
2013, 2018), the expression of ambivalence may also be intended
as a validating framework for those ambivalent others who
experience an attitudinal conflict. The aim of Study 2 was to
address this issue directly and, at the same time, offer a conceptual
replication of Study 1.
A first minor divergence from Study 1 was the use of a
different attitude object, namely, abortion—a topic known to
be associated with ambivalence (Craig et al., 2002; Schneider
et al., 2015)—, with the aim of making our findings more
generalizable to other attitude objects. The second and most
important modification was that the self-presentation paradigm
included an additional task in every condition. This task
consisted of the composition of an essay that reflected the
participants’ personal opinion about abortion. Similar to the
other attitude measures, this essay would ostensibly be shared
with the perceiver, and therefore its composition allowed us
to infer underlying self-presentation intentions. In each self-
presentation condition, people composed their essay by choosing
among several pre-tested statements that reflected either positive
or negative evaluations toward abortion or statements that
validated ambivalent attitudes. These “ambivalence-validating”
statements referred to claims that normalized two-sided stances
and, more broadly, the experience of ambivalence toward
abortion. One might argue that the task constrained (or aided)
participants in terms of their attitude expression. Despite this,
this task offered three important advantages. First, it allowed
simple and systematic quantitative analysis of the content of
the essay. Second, it offered participants a channel to express
attitudes with specific content, in contrast to Study 1. Third,
since the manipulated attitudinal profiles did not include
any essay, the task avoided that participants anchored their
selection of statements to their perceiver’s selection, as could
have occurred with the responses to the attitude measures
used in Study 1.
As for the experimental design of this study, it did not
differ from Study 1, beyond the addition of the new dependent
measures related to the composition of the essay. Thus, we
expected to replicate the self-presentation pattern found in Study
1. Moreover, we hypothesized that the perceiver’s attitudinal
profile would determine how people composed their essay toward
abortion. Specifically, we formulated different pre-registered
hypotheses2 regarding the overall (ambi)valence of the essay
through the use of statements in favor or against and the
use of “ambivalence-validating” statements. Taking always the
participants’ baseline essay as a reference, we predicted that
those matched with an ambivalent perceiver would compose
a more two-sided essay (i.e., higher number of positive and
negative statements) to create a positive impression, whereas
the essay would be more one-sided (i.e., higher number of
positive or negative statements) when instructed to make
a negative impression. The essay of those assigned to the
univalent perceiver (in this study, a univalent negative perceiver)
would be more negative in the self-enhancement condition,
whereas it would become more positive in the self-depreciation
condition. Additionally, we predicted that when interacting
with an ambivalent perceiver, people would make more use
of ambivalence-validating statements when asked to generate
a positive impression. We expected this difference to be
greater among those matched with the subjectively ambivalent
(vs. objectively ambivalent) perceiver given that people could
anticipate the perceiver’s need for receiving some validation
of their experienced attitudinal conflict. In contrast, regarding
the univalent negative perceiver, we predicted a lesser use of
this kind of statements in the self-enhancement condition. In
the self-depreciation condition, we expected a decrease in the
number of ambivalence-validating statements without significant
differences among perceiver’s attitudinal profiles.
Method
Ethics Statement
As a conceptual replication, this study followed the same
recommendations provided for Study 1 by the Ethics Review
Board of the Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences (FMG) of
the University of Amsterdam. All subjects gave written informed
consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Participants
Based on the power analysis performed for Study 1, we decided to
recruit 300 participants in two equally spaced batches (n = 150),
following a sequential approach (Lakens, 2014). We recruited a
first batch of 163 participants from the United States through
the online platform Prolific Academic, who were compensated
with 1.28 USD. Fourteen participants who did not complete
the study or failed one of the two attention checks included
in the study (i.e., “In this question, we want you to click
six” and within the essay composition “Do not select this
option. This is an attention check for random clickers.”) were
excluded from the analyses. This resulted in 149 participants
(50.3% female, Mage = 33.15, SDage = 11.23, ranging from 18
to 75). Given that the first batch of collected data did not
allow to run exactly equally spaced analyses, we estimated
an adjustment of the alpha level at 0.0248 using spending
functions (Lakens, 2014). With this adjustment, most of our
hypotheses were supported; hence, we decided to stop our
data collection.
2The pre-registration of Study 2 can be accessed at: https://osf.io/w26uf.
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Procedure
The study followed a similar procedure as in Study 1, with only
two differences. First, we changed our measure of attitude valence
for a semantic bipolar scale built with pairs of opposite adjectives
(e.g., moral–immoral). This scale was added to the stimuli used
for manipulating the perceiver’s attitudinal profile, with the
univalent negative perceiver reporting overall negative scores
and the objectively and subjectively ambivalent perceivers’ scores
close to the midpoint (see Supplementary Material). Second,
after responding to the measures of OA, SA, and attitude valence
in each within-subject self-presentation condition, participants
were asked to compose the essay that reflected their viewpoint
about abortion. To do so, participants were offered to choose
from a list of 15 different statements at least once and as
many as they considered for expressing their personal view.
According to a pre-test with a different sample (N = 115; see
Supplementary Material), five of these statements reflected an
opinion in favor of abortion (e.g., “Abortion is essential in the
case of rape, where women should definitely have the choice of
terminating their pregnancy”), another five an opinion against
abortion (e.g., “Since life begins at conception, abortion is akin
to murder as it is the act of taking human life.”), and the last five
“ambivalence-validating” statements normalized the experience
of conflicting thoughts, indecision, and mixed reactions toward
abortion (e.g., “Abortion is a controversial topic that many people
feel torn about.”). The offered statements seemed to represent
well the individual opinion of our participants. In the baseline
measure, people selected on average 6.30 statements (SD = 2.55,
ranging from 1 to 13 statements), and when asked to report how
adequately the selected statements represented their views about
abortion in a scale from −3 (not adequately at all) to 3 (very
adequately), the average selection of statements was considered
significantly adequate (M = 1.82, SD = 1.19) in comparison with
the midpoint of the scale, t(148) = 18.750, p < 0.001, d = 1.536.
After completing the tasks under each the different self-
presentation instructions, participants were debriefed and
informed about their compensation.
Measures
Objective and subjective ambivalence
We used the same measures of OA and SA
(α = 0.849) as in Study 1.
Attitude valence
Our measure of attitude valence toward abortion consisted
of four 7-point semantic bipolar scales built with pairs of
opposite adjectives (−3—immoral, harmful, wrong, irresponsible,
3—moral, beneficial, right, responsible). The overall scale had a
high internal consistency (α = 0.965), and therefore an average
score was calculated for each participant.3
Message ambivalence
In a similar way to the measure of OA, we used the sums of
positive and negative statements people selected for their essays
3In order to be consistent with the measures and results from Study 1, we deviated
from the valence-similarity measure specified in the pre-registration (i.e., the
difference between the perceiver’s valence and the participant’s valence), without
this deviation affecting our results.
in Thompson et al.’s (1995) formula, in order to compute the
extent to which people’s essay expressed a one-sided or a two-
sided message: 1/2 (Positive+ Negative)− |Positive− Negative|
. Higher scores would represent an essay with a high number of
positive AND negative statements (i.e., two-sided essay), whereas
lower scores would represent an essay with a high number of
positive OR negative statements (i.e., one-sided essay).
Ambivalence validation
We measured the social validation of the perceiver’s ambivalence
through the number of “ambivalence-validating” statements
selected for the composition of the essay.
Message valence
We used the difference between the number of positive
statements and the number of negative statements as measure
of message valence. Hence, values above zero will mean
a predominantly positive essay regarding abortion, whereas




Three independent GLM analyses showed that participants
distinguished their perceiver congruently to the manipulated
attitudinal profiles. The perceivers significantly differed in how
positive/negative, F(2,146) = 102.953, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.585,
clear/confused, F(2,146) = 116.870, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.616,
and confident/unconfident, F(2,146) = 119.192, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.620, participants perceived their opinion toward abortion.
As Table 2 summarizes, the univalent negative perceiver
significantly held the most negative opinion, whereas the
objectively ambivalent had a slightly positive opinion, and the
subjectively ambivalent moved around the midpoint. In addition,
the subjectively ambivalent perceiver was again the one with
the most confused and the least confident stance, followed by
the objectively ambivalent perceiver and finally the univalent
negative, whom participants considered to hold a fairly clear
and confident opinion. Every pairwise comparison reached
significance (ps ≤ 0.014) after applying Bonferroni corrections.
Ambivalence and Self-Presentation
To be consistent with the analyses in Study 1 and a better
accounting of the within-subject variance, we deviated from
the pre-registered repeated measures GLMs and tested our
hypotheses through three independent mixed models. The pre-
registered analyses offered the exact same results and are
TABLE 2 | Estimated mean levels of manipulations checks used to describe the




Univalent negative -2.43 [-2.75, -2.11] 2.61 [2.21, 3.01] 2.64 [2.25, 3.03]
Objectively ambivalent 0.65 [0.34, 0.97] 0.13 [-0.26, 0.52] 0.28 [-0.11, 0.66]
Subjectively ambivalent 0.01 [-0.30, 0.32] -1.69 [-2.08, -1.31] -1.61 [-1.99, -1.23]
In brackets, lower and upper bounds of 95% CIs. Scales were from -3 to 3.
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accessible through the Supplementary Material. Our main
focus was again the moderating effect of the self-presentation
instructions as a function of the perceiver’s attitudinal profile on
the expression of OA, SA, and attitude valence. In every model,
we entered the fixed effects of the perceiver’s attitudinal profile,
the self-presentation conditions, and the two-way interaction
between them. As a random factor, we included the participant’s
ID. In this case, the model with OA as dependent measure was
the one having a singular fit; therefore, we conducted a repeated
measures GLM analysis without the random factor.
Objective ambivalence
We found significant main effects of both self-presentation
instructions, F(2,292) = 45.927, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.239, and
the perceiver’s attitudinal profile, F(2,146) = 34.070, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.318. Furthermore, the two-way interaction between
these two factors was significant, F(4,292) = 15.442, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.175 (see Figure 2A). Simple effect analyses showed
that in the self-enhancement condition, participants matched
with the objectively and the subjectively ambivalent perceivers
reported more OA relative to their baselines (ps < 0.001),
but did not differ from each other (p = 0.99). Regarding
the univalent negative perceiver, participants reported lower
levels of OA (p < 0.001). In contrast, in the self-depreciation
condition, OA decreased across profiles (ps ≤ 0.020), with the
lowest OA reported toward the univalent negative perceiver,
in comparison with the objectively and subjectively ambivalent
perceivers (p = 0.012), and without significant differences
between these two (p = 0.99). These results generally reproduce
the similarity pattern observed in Study 1, with similarly
FIGURE 2 | Moderated influence of self-presentation instructions by the perceiver’s attitudinal profile on reported OA (A), SA (B), and attitudinal valence (C) in Study
2. Error bars represent 97.52% CIs.
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ambivalent (univalent) attitudes to the ones expressed by
the ambivalent (univalent) perceivers when the goal was to
make a good impression and dissimilarly univalent attitudes
when aiming at generating a bad impression. The only
exception was the differences between the objectively and
subjectively ambivalent perceivers in the self-enhancement
condition, which plausibly did not emerge due to the smaller
sample size of this study.
Subjective ambivalence
The two fixed effects of self-presentation, F(2,292) = 26.252,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.110, the perceiver’s attitudinal profile,
F(2,146) = 10.978, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.049, and the two-way
interaction, F(4,292) = 24.935, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.191, were
significant (see Figure 2B). Simple effects showed that, in the
self-enhancement condition, participants who were matched
with the subjectively ambivalent perceiver significantly increased
their reported SA relative to their baseline (p < 0.001) and
significantly decreased it in the self-depreciation condition
(p < 0.001). Those matched with the univalent negative perceiver
expressed significantly lower SA in the self-enhancement
condition (p = 0.007), but a similar level in the self-depreciation
condition relative to the baseline (p = 0.056). Participants
expressing their SA toward the objectively ambivalent perceiver
reported similar levels across self-presentation conditions
(ps ≥ 0.65). These results indicate that the expression of
SA was mainly modulated in the self-presentation toward
the subjectively ambivalent perceiver, but not toward the
univalent negative and the objectively ambivalent perceivers.
While for the former, people assumed that a shared experience
of SA would lead to a positive evaluation, for the latter
expressing SA was not useful to enhance (or depreciate)
their social image.
Attitude valence
The attitude valence significantly varied as a function of self-
presentation conditions, F(2,292) = 14.121, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.064,
but not of attitudinal profiles, F(2,146) = 1.241, p = 0.29,
η2p = 0.006. We observed that these two factors significantly
interacted, F(4,292) = 51.775, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.333 (see
Figure 2C). Simple effects indicated that for the univalent
negative perceiver, participants reported significantly more
negative attitudes in the self-enhancement condition (p < 0.001)
and significantly more positive attitudes in the self-depreciation
condition (p < 0.001) than their baseline. The attitudes
expressed toward the objectively and subjectively ambivalent
perceivers did not differ in the self-enhancement condition
(ps ≥ 0.87), but they were significantly more negative in the
self-depreciation condition (ps ≤ 0.002) relative to the baseline.
As in Study 1, a similarity–dissimilarity pattern clearly emerged
with the univalent perceiver, and to a certain degree with the
ambivalent perceivers to which people expressed in the self-
enhancement condition similarly in the middle ground (nor
predominantly positive or negative), and more negative in the
self-depreciation condition.
Essay Composition
Our second objective was to dig into participants’ intentions
behind the similarity/dissimilarity self-presentation. For this
purpose, we analyzed the selection of statements for the
composition of essays that reflected their personal view
about abortion. Table 3 summarizes the average number of
positive, negative, and ambivalence-validating statements in
each self-presentation condition and across the three perceiver’s
attitudinal profiles. In order to test whether the interaction
between these two factors influenced the message ambivalence,
ambivalence validation, and overall attitude valence of the
composed essay, we performed three mixed models including
the same predictors as in previous analyses with these three new
dependent measures.
Message ambivalence
The fixed effects of both self-presentation, F(2,292) = 13.033,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.069, and the perceiver’s attitudinal profile,
F(2,146) = 7.458, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.041, as well as the two-
way interaction turned out to be significant, F(4,292) = 6.268,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.066 (see Figure 3A). Simple effect analyses
showed that, relative to the baseline, those who were matched
with the univalent negative perceiver composed a significantly
more one-sided essay in the self-enhancement (p = 0.002)
and the self-depreciation conditions (p = 0.002). For the
objectively and subjectively ambivalent perceivers, participants
showed significantly higher mean levels in the self-enhancement
condition than in their baselines (p = 0.042 and p = 0.018,
respectively), but no differences in the self-depreciation condition
(ps ≥ 0.23). Note that a marginal increase in our OA measure,
with mean values around zero, could imply that either the average
essay was indeed more two-sided, or that the average essay did
not make use of positive or negative statements. A descriptive
look at the data suggested that for the two ambivalent perceivers,
both explanations applied. In the self-enhancement condition,
among those matched with the objectively ambivalent perceiver,
there were 18% more essays that did not use positive or negative
statements relative to the baseline, whereas 44% of the essays
were more two-sided (or less one-sided). In the case of the group
matched with the subjectively ambivalent perceiver, 37.25% more
essays did not use positive and negative statements, whereas
33.33% of the essays were more two-sided (or less one-sided).
Bear in mind that participants had to select at least one statement,
meaning that those essays that did not include any positive
or negative statements were instead including “ambivalence-
validating” statements.
Ambivalence validation
The fixed effects of self-presentation, F(2,292) = 51.599,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.206, and the perceiver’s attitudinal
profile, F(2,146) = 5.407, p = 0.005, η2p = 0.026, were
significant, as it was the interaction between both factors,
F(4,292) = 20.656, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.172 (see Figure 3B).
Simple effects indicated that, in the self-enhancement condition,
participants matched with the univalent negative perceiver
significantly decreased the number of ambivalence-validating
statements relative to the baseline (p < 0.001). Importantly,
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TABLE 3 | Average number of each type of statement selected in each self-presentation condition toward each perceiver’s attitudinal profile – Study 2.
Type of statement
Experimental condition Positive Negative Ambivalence-validating Total
Control
Univalent negative 2.69 [2.06, 3.31] 1.25 [0.83, 1.67] 2.38 [1.86, 2.89] 6.31 [5.55, 7.08]
Objectively ambivalent 3.20 [2.62, 3.78] 1.10 [0.68, 1.52] 2.22 [1.76, 2.68] 6.52 [5.65, 7.39]
Subjectively ambivalent 2.61 [2.05, 3.16] 1.37 [0.89, 1.85] 2.08 [1.54, 2.61] 6.06 [5.19, 6.93]
Self-enhancement
Univalent negative 0.40 [0.11, 0.68] 3.27 [2.73, 3.81] 0.75 [0.31, 1.19] 4.42 [3.82, 5.01]
Objectively ambivalent 2.32 [1.71, 2.93] 0.92 [0.47, 1.37] 2.86 [2.25, 3.47] 6.10 [5.17, 7.03]
Subjectively ambivalent 1.14 [0.66, 1.61] 0.88 [0.48, 1.28] 3.27 [2.67, 3.88] 5.29 [4.39, 6.20]
Self-depreciation
Univalent negative 3.81 [3.32, 4.30] 0.38 [0.14, 0.61] 1.10 [0.60, 1.61] 5.29 [4.59, 6.00]
Objectively ambivalent 0.74 [0.34, 1.14] 2.88 [2.36, 3.40] 0.98 [0.50, 1.46] 4.60 [3.87, 5.33]
Subjectively ambivalent 1.22 [0.68, 1.75] 2.25 [1.66, 2.85] 0.33 [0.13, 0.53] 3.80 [3.19, 4.42]
In brackets, lower and upper bounds of 97.52% CIs.
this type of statements increased for the subjectively ambivalent
perceiver (p < 0.001), and for the objectively ambivalent
perceiver, even though in this last case the difference with
the baseline did not reach significance (p = 0.077). Between
these two ambivalent perceivers, the difference of ambivalence-
validating statements was not significant (p = 0.51), although
its directionality was congruent to what we predicted. In
the self-depreciation condition, the number of ambivalence-
validating statements significantly decreased across profiles
(ps < 0.001) with only significantly less ambivalence-validating
statements toward the subjectively ambivalent perceiver relative
to the univalent negative perceiver (p = 0.035). The remaining
comparisons between profiles were not significant. Overall,
these results indicated that the validation of ambivalent stances
toward abortion was as a self-presentation strategy toward the
ambivalent perceivers, with certain signs suggesting that this
validation was more evident in those essays directed to the
subjectively ambivalent perceiver.
Message valence
The self-presentation manipulation significantly affected the
overall valence of the essay, F(2,438) = 28.828, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.116, whereas attitudinal profile did not exert any effect,
F(2,438) = 1.792, p = 0.168, η2p = 0.008. Their interaction turned
out to be significant, F(4,438) = 59.408, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.352
(see Figure 3C). Simple effects analysis showed that, whereas
in the self-enhancement condition, the message valence did not
significantly change for the objectively ambivalent (p = 0.42) and
the subjectively ambivalent (p = 0.11) perceivers compared with
their baselines, for the univalent negative perceiver, participants
composed a more negative essay (p < 0.001). In the self-
depreciation condition, the pattern reversed for the univalent
negative perceiver, with the message of the essays being more
positive than in the baseline (p < 0.001). Significantly more
negative were the essays toward the objectively ambivalent
(p < 0.001) and the subjectively ambivalent (p < 0.001), without
these significantly differing between each other (p = 0.059).
Discussion
The first set of results from Study 2 closely replicated the
pattern observed in Study 1, with a different attitude object (i.e.,
abortion) and with a negative univalent profile. People mimicked
the attitudinal profile of univalent and ambivalent perceivers
when the goal was to make a positive impression on them,
while adopting an opposing attitudinal profile when they aimed
to make a negative impression. We also observed that people
differentiated between ambivalent perceivers based on the latter’s
level of experienced attitudinal conflict, using (avoiding) the
expression of conflict to enhance (depreciate) their social image
when addressing the subjectively ambivalent perceiver.
Study 2 further showed how people used the same self-
presentation strategies when expressing their attitudes through
the composition of an essay about abortion. For the univalent
negative perceiver, we observed a clear switch in the participants’
essays from an overall negative message in the self-enhancement
condition to an overall positive message in the self-depreciation
condition. Regarding the ambivalent perceivers, participants
generated a positive image by slightly balancing the number of
statements expressing a positive and a negative stance, but mainly
by focusing their overall message in statements that validated
the holding of an ambivalence stance toward abortion, especially
when the perceiver was subjectively ambivalent.
Although in general terms our predictions were supported,
there were some hypothesized differences that our data did
not confirm, such as the higher ambivalence validation in the
case of the subjectively ambivalent perceiver relative to the
objectively ambivalent perceiver. There are two methodological
issues that could explain this. First, our sequential approach to
data collection could have compromised our statistical power
for detecting some expected between-subject differences. In
addition, the application of conservative corrections for multiple
comparisons saved us from potential type I errors, but could
have also increased the probability of type II errors. Second,
the measures chosen for analyzing the composition of the essay
were perhaps not optimal. As we observed in the data, some
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FIGURE 3 | Moderated influence of self-presentation instructions by the perceiver’s attitudinal profile on message ambivalence (A), ambivalence validation (B), and
message valence (C) in Study 2. Error bars represent 97.52% CIs.
differences between participants’ essays toward one or the other
perceiver were not captured by the absolute number of one
type of statements, but would have been by the relative use
of one type versus the other (e.g., ambivalence-validating vs.
positive and negative). Put differently, our analyses focused
on the amount of information included in the essay and
neglected potential differences in the emphasis of its message
that the data descriptively suggest. Despite these limitations, we
believe these results to be in line with the proposed rationale
about why sharing ambivalence enhances interpersonal liking.
When others express themselves as ambivalent, presenting
oneself as similarly ambivalent while explicitly normalizing
their ambivalent stance seemed to be an intuitive strategy that
participants used for generating a positive social image. As
previously discussed, this highlights not only the intention of
socially validating the perceiver’s ambivalent attitude (in the
case of the objectively ambivalent perceiver) but also their
experience of attitudinal conflict (in the case of the subjectively
ambivalent perceiver).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Interpersonal liking relies to some extent on sharing similar
attributes with others. In the attitudes domain, an extensive body
of literature suggests that sharing a similar stance about a specific
topic enhances interpersonal liking (e.g., Byrne et al., 1971;
Singh et al., 2008). However, this so-called attitude-similarity
effect has barely been studied in relation to ambivalent attitudes.
The present research investigated the relationship between
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sharing ambivalent attitudes and interpersonal liking and offered
evidence in support of a similarity effect previously neglected
in attitude-similarity research. In our studies, people expressed
similar (univalent) ambivalent attitudes to make a positive
social image on (univalent) ambivalent perceivers (Studies 1
and 2). Moreover, people’s subjective ambivalence predicted
the interpersonal liking toward a subjectively ambivalent other
(Study 1). Importantly, the generated—or perceived—similarity
observed in this research was not limited to the attitudinal
structure (i.e., OA), but extended to the affective response
of conflict associated with it (i.e., SA). Our research further
suggests that sharing a similar experience of attitudinal conflict
with others might indicate a disposition to socially validate
the perceiver’s attitudinal conflict, as reflected in the attempts
to normalize the holding of ambivalence when addressing
ambivalent others (Study 2).
The unpleasant emotional state that ambivalent attitudes often
elicit entails an important motivational factor that facilitates the
interpretation of the obtained findings. People cope with their
discomfort of feeling ambivalent by resolving the attitudinal
inconsistency or by focusing on the reduction of that negative
affective state (van Harreveld et al., 2009). Although the first
option might be a more efficient strategy in the long term,
people frequently find more immediate and effortless solutions
for coping with the discomforting feeling of conflict (e.g.,
delay of the decision; Roster and Richins, 2009; van Harreveld
et al., 2009). One of these solutions could be to interact with
other ambivalent attitude holders that similarly experience the
unpleasantness of being conflicted. Our research supports this
notion by demonstrating that people express to be attitudinally
conflicted to make a good impression on subjectively ambivalent
others, and more directly, by showing that people’s SA predicts
liking of subjectively ambivalent others.
These findings are aligned with previous research on
emotional similarity. According to this line of work, if people
realized that other individuals experience similar emotional
reactions, they would not only find their emotional reaction to
be socially validated (Anderson and Keltner, 2004), but they
could also expect to receive more effective social support from
someone who understands how they feel (Verhofstadt et al.,
2008). Some studies have offered evidence of emotional similarity
reducing individual stress in a shared threatening situation
(i.e., public speech; Townsend et al., 2014). From these results,
Townsend et al. (2014) argued that sharing emotional reactions
with others might enhance certainty or predictability over the
situation, which ultimately explains the decrease in levels of
stress. Similarly, we argue that shared SA might be useful to
decrease the discomforting experience of attitudinal conflict.
Returning to the opening example of the current paper, if Robin
learnt that Sam experienced his same feeling of conflict about
nuclear disarmament, Robin would realize that his SA was not as
unusual an emotional reaction as he would have thought. Since
another person was experiencing the same kind of attitudinal
incongruence (i.e., validating his SA), this could help to reduce
his negative experience of conflict. From Sam’s perspective, if
he knew that Robin felt conflicted toward nuclear disarmament,
a potentially efficient strategy for enhancing his interpersonal
liking would be to acknowledge that he also feels ambivalent, and
that feeling ambivalent about nuclear disarmament is something
common. In short, sharing ambivalence might be positively
perceived when there is a motivation toward reducing the
unpleasant experience of attitudinal conflict and, therefore, a
good self-presentation strategy for enhancing interpersonal liking
when interacting with an ambivalent other.
Although our interpretation of the link between ambivalence
and interpersonal liking has mainly focused on its affective
nature, this does not exclude the possibility that people
strategically express ambivalence for other reasons. Ambivalent
individuals might indeed be positively perceived based on
their image of competence for offering pondered and balanced
perspectives about controversial topics (Pillaud et al., 2013,
2018). Furthermore, a growing line of research highlights the
benefits of ambivalence for cognitive and emotional regulation,
such as increase of attention and creativity (Fong, 2006), less
biased decision-making (Guarana and Hernandez, 2016), higher
estimation accuracy (Rees et al., 2013), and more effective coping
with outcome uncertainty (Plambeck and Weber, 2009; Reich
and Wheeler, 2016). These attributes contribute to the overall
social attractiveness of an ambivalent attitude holder depending
on the context (e.g., deliberative vs. executive decision-making)
and the fulfillment of the perceiver’s needs (e.g., resolution of
attitudinal conflict).
This research is not exempt from some limitations. First,
the presented evidence relies on survey data, collected
in an online setting where participants did not expect to
interact with their perceiver. Thus, our dependent measures
did not capture actual behavior, but rather behavioral
intention. Future research could replicate these results
in an interactive, and more externally valid setting (e.g.,
real 1-to-1 interactions). Nevertheless, we believe that
our setup offered experimental control over contextual
modulators potentially present in real interactions (e.g.,
similarity–dissimilarity of other attributes, conversational
dynamics, etc.), while still allowing to capture the strategic
component of attitude expression. Furthermore, this research
might be insufficient to draw firm conclusions about
the underlying processes behind the social preferences
of ambivalent attitude holders. In this regard, further
research should investigate in more depth whether the
social validation of subjective ambivalence has any effect
on the endorsement of the ambivalent stance and, more
importantly, the affective experience of attitudinal conflict.
This would additionally shed light on the effectiveness of
expressing ambivalence with the intention of enhancing
one’s social image.
In addition, the extension of these results in applied
contexts could lead to research questions with relevant practical
implications. For example, it has already been proposed
that shared ambivalence between leaders and followers in
organizational settings relates to a better interpretation of the
organizational context (Guarana and Hernandez, 2015). In their
work, Guarana and Hernandez (2015) suggest that relational
proximity between leader and follower increases the degree
to which they share ambivalence about the context. Based
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on our findings, we wonder whether the identification of
shared ambivalence could enhance relational (or interpersonal)
proximity and, ultimately, not only improve the interpretation
of the organizational context but also positively influence the
work environment in the organization. In a similar vein, it
would be interesting to examine whether sharing the experience
of attitudinal conflict has positive effects on individual and
interpersonal well-being. For example, in the domain of
close relationships, previous research showed that (univalent)
attitude similarity between partners is negatively associated
with depression (Moore et al., 2017). It is plausible that
the identification of those topics that partners feel similarly
torn about could be good guidance for partner therapy to
strengthen both the relationship and the partners’ well-being
in it. Finally, our results might be relevant for the field of
social communication. According to the present research, the
understanding of the other’s state of attitudinal conflict is
important when presenting oneself, but it might also become
crucial when presenting others. Thus, related fields, such
as political marketing and institutional and organizational
communication—where often the goal is to enhance the social
image of a political leader, an institution, or a company—
, should consider that holding similarly ambivalent positions
to their target audience might be an alternative strategy as a
function of the context.
CONCLUSION
Our research contributes to the ambivalence literature by
suggesting that sharing ambivalent stances with others seems to
have an important interpersonal function in the enhancement of
one’s social image, and potentially in the psychological comfort
of those who actually hold an ambivalent attitude that they
experience as conflicting. Mechanisms of social validation, as
proposed by work on attitude similarity, would explain why
sharing ambivalence can also be a strategy that people follow
for pursuing interpersonal liking and why ambivalent attitude
holders prefer others who experience a similar attitudinal conflict.
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